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Abstract: 
In this paper, the author reconsiders the role played by Lacan in Ricœur’s philosophy of psychoanalysis by 
reconstructing the history of the relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy, and by focusing on 
some of the important aspects of the reception of Ricœur’s work in France. The reception of his work is 
directly connected to Lacan’s School and the role played by his followers, who were against Ricœur. Some 
of the unpublished documents kept at the Fonds Ricœur should help to clarify some points in this regard. 
These documents should help to demonstrate how the incompatibility of Ricœur’s interpretation with 
Lacan’s structural perspective was determined more by their personal incompatibility and their different 
interests than by a genuine incommensurability in their theories. 
Keywords: Psychoanalysis, Hermeneutics, Structuralism, Language, Epistemology. 
Résumé: 
Dans cet article, l'auteur revient sur le rôle joué par Lacan dans la philosophie de la psychanalyse de Ricœur 
en reparcourant l'histoire de la relation entre psychanalyse et philosophie, et en revenant sur certains des 
aspects importants de la réception de l’œuvre de Ricœur en France. La réception de l’œuvre ricœurienne est 
directement liée à l'école lacanienne et au rôle joué par ses disciples, dans leur opposition à Ricœur. À ce 
titre, certains des documents inédits conservés au Fonds Ricœur aident à clarifier plusieurs points 
concernant cette confrontation. Selon l’auteur, ces documents démontrent comment l’incompatibilité de 
l’interprétation de Ricœur avec la perspective structuraliste de Lacan a été davantage déterminée par leur 
incompatibilité personnelle et leur divergence d’intérêts que par une distance théorique effectivement 
incommensurable. 
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There is no doubt that the relationship between Ricœur and Lacan today constitutes one 
of the most intriguing chapters in the history of French psychoanalysis, even though Ricœur’s 
philosophy of psychoanalysis has not been very relevant in France. What is meaningful is the fact 
that Roudinesco, in her vast Histoire de la psychanalyse en France (2 vol., 1982-1986), introduces 
Ricœur’s contribution as an “intermezzo” with a focus that is more biographical than theoretical. 
Actually, when Ricœur was writing his De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud (1965), a critical and 
speculative synthesis in a hermeneutical key, French cultural life was under the influence of 
linguistics, rather than hermeneutics. This is an important aspect to consider in evaluating the 
function played by Ricœur’s philosophy in French psychoanalysis, and a similar evaluation must 
be made considering the personal and professional history of relationships and intellectual 
coalitions. In fact, this profoundly marked the evolution of psychoanalysis in France, as 
Roudinesco has clearly shown. What is particular and common for each one of the 
psychoanalytical theoretical and practical perspectives in France is the fact that, almost since the 
beginning, the history of the evolution of psychoanalysis was intertwined with philosophy; and, 
within Europe, a similar case can be found only in Germany.  
Even if my interest in this article is theoretical – I want to re-consider the role played by 
Lacan’s theory of psychoanalysis in Ricœur’s philosophy of psychoanalysis –, it is essential to (1) 
reconstruct (as concisely as possible) the history of the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
philosophy, and (2) investigate some of the important aspects of the reception of Ricœur’s work 
in France. The reception of his work there, in fact, is directly connected to Lacan’s School – an 
important part of the French psychoanalytical world in the nineteen sixties and seventies – and 
the role played by his followers, against Ricœur. Some of the unpublished documents kept at the 
Fonds Ricœur should help us to clarify some points in this regard. This is an important step 
because it will help to demonstrate how the incompatibility of Ricœur’s interpretation with 
Lacan’s structural perspective was further caused by their personal incompatibility and personal 
interests rather by a bottomless theoretical distance. 
Surprisingly enough, this long story of biographical and ideological tensions has been 
prevented by both sides from clarifying the mutual positive and theoretical influence. With this 
paper I will try to thematise the epistemic role played by Lacan’s theory in Ricœur’s 
interpretation of psychoanalysis after his De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud.  
Vinicio Busacchi 
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 The Entrance of Psychoanalysis in France: Ricœur and Lacan’s Choice Between 
Hermeneutics and Structuralism  
One of the privileged means of entry into psychoanalysis in France was through the 
cultural world of literature and art, specifically surrealism, a world in which an interest in and 
connection with philosophy and science was one of the main characteristics of psychoanalysis. 
Actually, some of the most interesting and favourable analyses of psychoanalysis appeared in Le 
disque vert, a surrealist review, in the nineteen twenties. But it was Ricœur’s first teacher of 
philosophy, Roland Dalbiez, who produced the first book (La méthode psychanalytique et la doctrine 
freudienne, 1936, 1949) on psychoanalysis, after a long work of theoretical and clinical research. 
After Dalbiez, next main reference in French philosophical studies on psychoanalysis was Jean-
Paul Sartre’s L’Être et le Néant (1943), a work in which psychoanalysis reaches the superior 
function of a speculative and procedural component of a philosophical construction. Later, from 
different perspectives and with different disciplinary interests, Merleau-Ponty and Lévi-Strauss 
pushed psychoanalysis towards new theoretical uses and developments. On the one side, 
Merleau-Ponty connected Freud’s psychoanalysis with his phenomenology, as a speculative 
source among other sciences for his phenomenology of perception; Ricœur would follow this line 
of research, connecting it to his reflexive and “spiritual” feeling. On the other side, Claude Lévi-
Strauss’ research and theoretical conception would prove to be favourable to the opening of 
structuralism to psychoanalysis (and vice versa), specifically through Jacques Lacan’s research 
and practice of psychoanalysis as therapy, which was theoretically linked to Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s linguistic lesson. If structuralism, characterized by works like Lévi-Strauss’ Tristes 
tropiques (1955), Anthropologie structurale (1958) and La pensée sauvage (1962), marked the end of 
spiritualistic hegemony in France, then Lacan’s counterposition to Ricœur must be considered 
and understood in this context, as part of a “war” between ideologies. Lévi-Strauss, more than 
others, contributed to transforming structuralism into a generalised methodological approach for 
the human sciences, as well as into a general view or doctrine about the human being. As a 
philosophical doctrine, it was the counterpart of idealism, historicism, and humanism; therefore, 
against this “spiritual” conception variably embraced by Ricœur, passing through existentialism 
(Jaspers), reflexive philosophy (Marcel, Nabert), phenomenology (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty), and 
personalism (Mounnier), and philosophically rooted in the Cartesian modern conception of self-
certainty of the Cogito, it is a subject of will with a fully epistemic and ethical focus. Structuralism 
refuted this conception declaring the dissolution of the human being and his death (Lévi-Strauss, 
Foucault). It refers to Freud’s discovery of the unconscious, to demonstrate that the ego is only a 
deformed part of the psychic life, and that “das Ich ist nicht Herr im eigenen Haus” (Freud). 
Lacan, Althusser, and others would sustain in various ways the thesis that it is not the motto 
“cogito ergo sum” that reveals the quintessence of the human reality and self-comprehension but 
the motto “Je pense où je ne suis pas; donc je suis où je ne pense pas.” 
Ricœur took on the challenge presented by Freud’s idea of the unconscious from the 
nineteen forties, critically and speculatively integrating it in his Philosophie de la volonté’s first book 
Le volontaire et l’involontaire. In the sixties, his decision to recognise and implement Gadamer’s 
approach within his phenomenology became more than a methodological re-modulation of his 
eidetic and reflexive approach by connecting the work of interpretation of symbols, myths, and 
sins. It became his solution to the crisis of the philosophie de l’esprit and at the same time an 
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alternative to the structuralist hegemony of the methodology and conception of the human 
sciences.1 His declaration, made at the end of Finitude et culpabilité (1960), that his empirical 
research must be transformed into an hermeneutical exercise applied to the symbols expressed 
within the work of psychoanalysis, the human sciences, criminology, and political science, must 
be understood under this vast point of view. Among Ricœur’s scientific and interdisciplinary 
experiences between the nineteen fifties and the sixties (in 1961 he held a series of conferences at 
Yale University that would be the basis for his De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud, 1965; during the 
same period he followed Lacan’s seminars in Paris; in 1963 he met Lévi-Strauss at the Esprit 
review headquarters…), perhaps one of the most representative and significant is the 6th colloque 
of Bonneval, an interdisciplinary congress organised in 1960 by the psychiatrist Henri Ey, where 
Ricœur made a contribution, Le conscient et l’inconscient, that was collected and published six 
years later2 and again nine years later in his Le conflict des interprétations (1969),3 but whose 
essential content was reproduced in the book of 1965.  
Responding to structuralism, Ricœur chose a double doorway, never focusing on it as an 
ideology: from one side, he seriously considered structural analysis as productive and legitimate 
when applied to specific determinate domains of experience, and as such he used it in 
articulation with other analyses; from the other side, he remodelled his personal conception of 
the human being by purifying it from those elements and aspects which made it both impossible 
and contradictory to incorporate into a reflexive philosophy the passage through a structural 
analysis.4 It was not the strategical but rather the logical and methodological consequence of 
Husserl’s recognition that the idea of direct access to the self-conscience had to be reconsidered. 
Ricœur’s Symbolique du mal and his hermeneutical détour demonstrated his recognition of 
psychoanalysis and Masters of Suspicion’s lesson that direct access to the Self is, by many ways, 
impossible.5 In fact, Ricœur’s antithetic position, against Heidegger’s ontology, of a philosophy of 
the long way held the consequence of the impracticability of an immediate knowledge and 
comprehension of the human being. From this point of view, Ricœur’s philosophical alternative 
and “answer” to psychoanalytic and structuralistic challenges appears as coherent and 
significant. To him, it is by applying reflection, through a hermeneutical phenomenology, to 
human spiritual and cultural signs and symbols that the subject can be indirectly rediscovered, 
exactly by these symbols and signs that attest his desire to be and his effort to exist. Thus, it is 
clear that Ricœur’s choice in favour of hermeneutics responds not only to a methodological need 
for an interdisciplinary application of philosophy to cultural products (symbols, myths…) or 
scientific objects of study (dreams, symptoms…), but also to the discovery of the complexity of 
the Self, having a fundamental closeness, and therefore follows the productive way, inevitably 
indirect, to gaining an entrance to the Self by the analysis of language and by the hermeneutics of 
symbols. In a similar general perspective, which is at the same time linguistic and hermeneutic, it 
is evident how structuralism may play a constructive and essential role in clarifying certain 
constitutive functions, and at the same time may represent the risk of an anti-anthropological and 
anti-humanistic drift. The semantic plan of analysis is intertwined with the plan of description 
and interpretation, as well as with the reflexive plan, but it is the last to reorganise and subsume 
the speculative consequences of a philosophical work exercised on language, symbols, and myth 
toward a comprehensive and humanistic understanding of what is human nature and what is 
human being.  
Vinicio Busacchi 
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Ricœur’s voie longue approach began with an analysis of language. The elaboration of a 
new problem of existence firstly must be based on the semantic analysis of interpretation as a 
technique applied to the symbols and myths that individuals produce by expressing and realising 
themselves. Secondly, it must be connected to a reflexive passage which has the goal of revealing 
how this cultural comprehension is a moment of self-comprehension.6 From this point of 
departure, it is possible to regressively reach a problem of the existence passing through the 
conflict of opposite hermeneutics, which are substantially rooted to the reality of the existential 
dynamism of regressive tendencies and forces, and progressive forces and drives. By presenting 
itself as an archaeology of the Self, Freud’s psychoanalysis prospects and indicates a course for an 
hermeneutic oriented to biological drives, to the arché, to the past, to infancy, all conceived as part 
of the place of the “lost” meaning of human existence. On the contrary, Hegel’s phenomenology 
of spirit presents itself as a teleological process, where its ultimate meaning lies in the future 
attempts (not only by the attainment of adulthood), after a series of passages and 
metamorphoses, suffering after suffering, contradiction after contradiction, and conflict after 
conflict. Ricœur’s discovery of the conflict of interpretations (due to the study of Freud)7 is in 
concordance with his philosophy of the Self, elaborated between Le volontaire et l’involontaire and 
De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud: essentially, the human being is conflictual.8 His inner dynamic 
division is reflected not only through the conflict between hermeneutics, but somehow also 
through the linguistic and disciplinary explosion of the discourse on the human being. The 
speculative challenge behind this problem of a philosophy of language is more than a problem of 
structural linguistics, although connected to it. Structural linguistics is met passing through a 
phenomenological hermeneutics applied to culture and symbols; an attempt to interpolate it faces 
the unstable domain of a war of hermeneutics (i.e., possible different interpretations), and 
immediately calls into play psychoanalysis and phenomenology. But before all of this, a general 
problem of instability and understanding about the human being arises. In fact,  
today we are in search of a comprehensive philosophy of language to account for the 
multiple functions of the human act of signifying and for their interrelationships. […] We 
have at our disposal a symbolic logic, an exegetical science, an anthropology, and a 
psychoanalysis and, perhaps for the first time, we are able to encompass in a single 
question the problem of the unification of human discourse.9 
But, “today the unity of human language poses a problem.” Consequently, even a 
comprehensive understanding of the human being constitutes a problem today. From this 
general point of view, the philosophical evaluation and use of psychoanalysis and structuralism 
in Ricœur’s hermeneutics must be primarily looked at as connected to this enquiry into language. 
However, a substantial difference persists, between psychoanalysis, even as a medical discipline 
and treatment, and structuralism: the former is focused on the subject; the latter is focused only 
signs, as unique contents of an objectified language. Therefore, this contemporary problem of a 
unification of the human language by the reunification of cultural and scientific discourses 
around the human being call into play the role of philosophy in mediation and synthesis, for the 
elaboration of a comprehensive philosophy of language. This interpretation re-addresses our 
focus on Ricœur’s hermeneutical phenomenology, now re-considerable as a philosophical 
attempt to subsume the challenge of a unified discourse on the human being as part of the 
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challenge to synthesise the human sciences’ diversified discourses on the human being under a 
certain comprehensive and unified speculative conception of the human being.  
A Difficult Dialectic 
The relationship between Lacan and Ricœur was very difficult from the beginning, as 
Ricœur recounts in his book-interview La critique et la conviction.10 Their relationship began at the 
congress of Bonneval, where Ricœur gave a very impressive speech sharing the essence of his 
new understanding of Freud, developed later in his 1965 essay, after two series of conferences on 
psychoanalysis given at the university of Yale in 1961, at the university of Louvain in the 
following year, and after having attended Lacan’s seminars in Paris at the beginning of the 
nineteen sixties. At the Fonds Ricœur, it is possible to consult his annotations taken during 
Lacan’s 1960-61 seminars on transference (it is a folio of about thirty pages) and 1962-63 seminars 
on anguish (a folio of about twenty pages). It was this mix between the charismatic supremacy of 
Lacan in France and the fact that Ricœur followed (or, better, made himself follow)11 his seminars 
for a certain period which provoked the false accusation of plagiarism in his book De 
l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud. However, in his Critique and Conviction Ricœur recalls in particular 
the lecture he gave at Bonneval, which “contains the essential elements of […] [his] interpretation 
of Freud, which had ripened over the course of […] [his] earlier teaching at the Sorbonne.”12 
Ricœur recalls too Lacan’s “incredible lack of intellectual integrity” in having asked and obtained 
the elimination “from the published volume of the Bonneval colloquium” the section of 
discussion “that took place after […] [his] lecture, in which […] [Lacan] participated.”13 Ricœur 
continues as follows:  
The other texts generally are followed by the discussion to which they gave rise, but not 
mine. This text is a key text because it presents my overall interpretation of Freud’s work, 
namely that the Freudian discourse is composite, and hence of great epistemological 
fragility, for it plays on two vocabularies: a vocabulary of energy, with terms like 
repression, energy, drive, and so on, and on the other hand, a vocabulary of sense and 
interpretation, present in the very title of Traumdeutung, The Interpretation of Dreams. I held 
that this composite character was to Freud’s credit, moreover, without classifying it as a 
defect of conceptualization or of epistemological lucidity; I saw this as a deliberate use of a 
language appropriate to its object, which itself is situated precisely at the point of 
articulation of the domains of force and of language.14  
If, on the one hand, it is true that it would be easy to reinforce Ricœur’s proof of his 
work’s originality having this section of discussion with Lacan; on the other, today it is much 
simpler to check and describe their theoretical differences by reading their works, because we 
stay so far from Lacanianism’s seductions. It is only by the effect of this Lacanian pervasive 
atmosphere that an author such as F. Châtelet could write that the De l’interprétation. Essai sur 
Freud (book Analytic) is a free reinterpretation where the reference to Lacan’s lesson is clear and 
constant (“l’on reconnaît clairement et constamment”).15 The opinions of R. Schérer, L. Beirnaert, 
and others are similar to the opinion of Châtelet.16 In particular, some articles against Ricœur’s De 
l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud, such as M. Tort’s De l’interprétation ou la machine herméneutique 
(1966),17 now prove to be fallacious and calumnious, although Tort’s had a strong effect because 
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the author was not a “Lacanian” and differed from other authors; like Valabrega,18 he developed 
a certain argumentation. In order to reinforce his position, Lacan instrumentally referred to Tort 
in his course on L’objet en psychanalyse (1965-66) given at the École Normale Supérieure de Paris 
(lesson of 23 March 1966), explicitly speaking of a case of plagiarism, and recognising Tort’s value 
in denouncing Ricœur’s “opération scandaleuse.” However, Tort’s re-reading was already 
considered as incorrect and unfounded by some of his contemporaries – one of them was 
A. Schlemmer –, even in relation to the accusation of a Ricœurian re-reading of Freud largely 
dependent on Lacan’s work.19 The Fonds Ricœur has the manuscript of Ricœur’s Bonneval 
lecture, given on 2 November 1960 (the manuscript for the conference is in 18 pages; the final 
manuscript for the publication, which is refined even in terms of references and quotes, is 
27 pages). The most important fact is that it demonstrates that Ricœur was correct in saying that 
he presented the essence of his own interpretation prior of his contact with Lacan.  
However, beyond of all of this, there is a clear, unique point in Ricœur’s interpretation of 
Freud’s psychoanalysis which does not have any connection with Lacan’s psychoanalysis: his 
thesis of Freud’s double epistemology, articulated with a hermeneutical register and an energetic 
register, as explained at the Bonneval colloque and in a more articulated manner in De 
l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud. It would be useful to reconsider some of the book Analytic and this 
explicit dialectic with Lacan, not simply to refocus on what is specific to Lacan and what is 
similar and different in Ricœur, but rather because after Adolf Grünbaum’s criticism of Ricœur’s 
[and Habermas’] interpretation of psychoanalysis in a hermeneutical key, he came back to re-
affirm his thesis and at the same time re-modulated narratively and linguistically his 
interpretation of Freud’s psychoanalysis. This reinterpretation brings Ricœur closer to Lacan, as 
seems to be quite evident in his 1978 paper Image and Language in Psychoanalysis more than other 
works published after De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud. We will observe this after a passage from 
his 1965 book and his response to Grünbaum’s critique.  
The Place of Lacan in Ricœur’s Interpretation of Freud’s Psychoanalysis  
Within De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud, only the first chapter of the section Dialectic 
contains an explicit reference to Lacan and a comparative analysis of his theory. However, 
indirectly, a generalised reference to structuralism and linguistics can be found throughout the 
entire book through its critical problematisation of a linguistic conception of the unconscious and, 
more generally, through the positioning of psychoanalysis “in the general debate on language.”20 
Without a doubt, Ricœur in this book levels a clear criticism against Lacan and his idea of an 
unconscious that is linguistically structured. For Lacan, the unconscious is not individual, 
because if on the one side it constitutes the history of the subject “in that it is a large text outside 
of the script which is conscious to the subject,”21 on the other it is – as Lacan clearly sustains – 
“that part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of 
the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse.”22 Ricœur, who embraced 
a totally different anthropological philosophy,23 specifically counterpoised his theoretical 
alternative, which is different for three reasons: (1) it contrasts the idea of a “linguistic dimension” 
with an idea of a “symbolic dynamism” which is the object of the hermeneutic exercise; (2) it 
contrasts the idea of a “linguistic structure” thematising the role and dynamic of an energetic 
dimension; and (3) it contrasts Lacan’s unilateral linguistic theory and epistemology with a 
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double epistemology and theory expressed through the dialectic of two different discursive and 
ontological registers: energetics and hermeneutics. In the first chapter (Epistemology: Between 
Psychology and Phenomenology) of the dialectical section, Ricœur condemns Freud’s theory of the 
unconscious as reductionist and distortive to limit it linguistically. First, this conception denies 
the economic point of view, but the point is that this conception of language as an instauration of 
meaning that takes place prior to any function or expression makes sense only in conjunction 
with the economic concepts of Freudian theory.  
The linguistic interpretation does not constitute an alternative to the economic 
explanation; it simply prevents the latter from being reified by showing that the 
mechanisms that come under the economics are accessible only in their relation to 
hermeneutics.24 
By maintaining that repression is nothing but a “metaphor” is not to overcome the 
economic hypothesis with a better one, but rather to parallel it with a linguistic interpretation, 
and thus to stay fixed in a unidimensional linguistic hermeneutics.  
It is impossible to make the absence of logic in dreams, their ignorance of “No,” accord 
with a state of real language […] Freud does not take language [le langage] into 
consideration when he treats of the unconscious but rather restricts its role to the 
preconscious and the conscious.25  
Second, if we consider linguistics in its strict sense of the science of language phenomena 
realised in and through a given language, then the symbolism of the unconscious can not be 
considered as a linguistic phenomenon.26  
However, something of “linguistic” or, better, some connection with a linguistic 
dimension must be at work, because between the unconscious and the conscious only a certain 
degree of closeness and correlation permits the “movement” from one to the other, and vice 
versa. In fact, the unconscious presents some infra- and supra-linguistic mechanisms, that is 
phenomena “structured like language,” but “like language” and not “linguistically structured.” 
“To call these mechanisms infra- or supralinguistic is, of course, still to refer them to language. 
That is precisely what constitutes the soundness of the linguistic interpretation.”27 In conclusion, 
Ricœur reads:  
The linguistic interpretation has the merit of raising all the phenomena of the primary 
process and of repression to the rank of language; the very fact that the analytic cure itself 
is language attests to the mixture of the quasi language of the unconscious and ordinary 
language. But the distortion – the Entstellung – which turns that other discourse into a 
quasi language is not itself achieved by language. The “infra” or the “supra” with respect 
to language is what separates psychoanalysis from phenomenology. This confusion of 
language is also what raises the urgent and difficult question of an archeology of the 
subject.28 
If it is not completely correct to speak of the influence of Lacan on Ricœur’s interpretation 
of the unconscious, it is nonetheless correct to consider the understanding of a “quasi language of 
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the unconscious” as having been developed using Lacan’s work as the main reference. At an 
important conference presentation given in Rome in 1964 (Technique et non-technique dans 
l’interprétation; later collected to form a chapter of The Conflict of interpretations), where even Lacan 
was present, Ricœur seems to have affirmed a stronger connection with the psychoanalyst. He 
explains that psychoanalysis does not start working on some observable behaviours, but rather 
with a non-sense that must be interpreted. Therefore, any attempt to assimilate psychoanalysis to 
a science of observation and to a technique generated by it does not grasp the essence of 
psychoanalysis: that is, the analytical experience is involved in the champ de la parole (Lacan’s 
formula) and, from this territorium, what comes to light is another language, as Lacan maintains 
and explains (Ricœur refers explicitly to him); a language which is dissociated from the common 
language, and that exposes itself to interpretation through the “effects of sense” provoked by this 
dissociation.29 Here the work of interpretation sounds much more like a decipherment of a (kind 
of) hieroglyphic instead of a fight against some resistance and mechanisms. But the point is that a 
similar flexion in Ricœur’s re-reading of Freud was already present in his De l’interprétation. Essai 
sur Freud, and precisely in a similar passage where, again, Lacan is explicitly quoted. The first 
chapter of the section Dialectic (the paragraph Confrontation with Internal Reformulations)30 is 
where he underlines how the  
analytic experience unfolds in the field of speech and that, within this field, what comes to 
light is another language, dissociated from common language, and which presents itself to 
be deciphered through its meaningful effects – symptoms, dreams, various formations, 
etc.31 
In a footnote, he quotes Lacan’s essay Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en 
psychanalyse (1953), specifying, however, that he diverges when he goes “on to criticise a 
conception that eliminates energy concepts in favour of linguistics.” Nevertheless, a certain 
ambiguity in his theoretical position is present there because of this reference to Lacan’s linguistic 
theory of the unconscious, where it is reasonable and rational to speak of a decipherment of the 
“meaningful effects” provoked by the dissociation of conceiving the linguistic constitution of the 
two dimensions, as well as the linguistic dynamism that permits the distortive or transformative 
passage from one to the other, and vice versa (from rational to symbolic and from symbolic to 
rational; from logic to palaeo-logic and from palaeo-logic to logic…). Even if short, nervous, and 
fragmentary, it is interesting to follow the discussion section of the same congress in Rome, after 
Lacan’s lecture Du trieb de Freud et du désir du psychanalyste [résumé], as it is published in the 
review Archivio di Filosofia.32 Ricœur tries to introduce his energetic point of view interpreting 
the concepts of condensation and displacement as referring to a dialectic of forces, where Lacan 
sees only a dialectic of “persuasion.” Then, Ricœur explains that he already finds this energetic 
aspect and dimension in the Freudian concept of work, arbeit, when used in expressions like 
dream work, work of displacement, and work of condensation. To him, it is not by chance that 
Freud uses the word durcharbeiten, “working-through,” in describing the analyst’s therapeutic 
exercise of interpretation. Unfortunately, this exchange is interrupted by a brusque answer by 
Lacan, who says just that in psychoanalysis things do not move in this way.33 What is clear is that 
where Ricœur reads the work of the analysis as a working-through, as a technique of psycho-
analysis which is opposed to Breuer’s catharsis, Lacan considers it far from Breuer’s catharsis and 
rather as a technique of persuasion, somehow nearer to rhetoric than challenge between 
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hermeneutics and energetics. This last point is an interpretative possibility that Ricœur 
considered as present, as fragmentary thematised, in Freud’s texts. He (constantly) re-conducts 
his ambiguous interpretation of the ambivalence of Freud’s writing, which offers a vast space for 
diversified linguistic interpretations, like Laplanche and Leclaire’s next to Lacan’s interpretation 
and others. For example, he writes:  
We have already noted the parallel between Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams and Jokes; it is 
based on the fact that the dream mechanisms of condensation and displacement appear to 
be well-defined figures of classical rhetoric; but we did not go beyond a general analogy. 
Starting from the role of the switch-words in the unconscious text of dreams, it is possible 
to develop in detail the interpretation of condensation as metaphor and displacement as 
metonymy.34  
Ricœur seems to be partially responsible for the difficult dialectics of linguistics, because 
he tries to implement partially the structuralist’s point of view, using his middle-way approach. 
But in so doing, he introduces another unbalanced element to his previous fluid interpretation of 
Freud’s psychoanalysis, which is articulated between energetics and hermeneutics. Certainly, this 
parallel and mixture between hermeneutic components and aspects and linguistic elements and 
concepts enrich and articulate his analysis, but the price to pay is that this theoretical synthesis, 
which is presented with an opened epistemology reflecting the double discursive register of 
Freud’s psychoanalysis, and appearing at the end as a discourse for all discourses, instead of 
solving Freud’s ambiguities and problems, uses it and multiplies it.  
However, it is interesting to look at how Ricœur, after his De l’interprétation. Essai sur 
Freud develops his research in two new productive directions: first, he works to develop a new 
epistemological model for philosophy as well as for the social and human sciences,35 articulated 
between explanation and understanding, finding in disciplines such as psychoanalysis and 
history examples of such an epistemology; second, he moves through a more hermeneutic 
understanding and use of psychoanalysis in his philosophy, specifically working around the 
narrative hermeneutics and the hermeneutics of the Self. Therefore, if the first reinforces and 
justifies Ricœur’s intertwining of different discursive and theoretical registers and 
epistemologies, connecting the problem of the foundation of psychoanalysis to the 
epistemological problem of the human sciences, the second establishes the centrality of the 
hermeneutical discourse in the linguistic one, regionalising this as an historical-theoretical 
passage, and at the same time re-absorbing it within the hermeneutic sphere.  
This thesis of a dualism of energetics and hermeneutics is in connection with Hyppolite’s 
analysis, which he developed in following up Dalbiez’s work. Ricœur continues with his critique; 
that in psychoanalysis there is a contrast between Freud’s positivist language (the topic of the 
ego, the superego, and the id, for example) and the character of his research and discovery.36 For 
Hyppolite, the originality of Freud lies in the discovery of psychical phenomena that are 
meaningful but need to be “decrypted” in their sense and meaning.37 Freud’s research was 
equipped with an inadequate language, covering the exegetical structure of the psychoanalytic 
procedure. In fact, starting from the interpretation of the psychic as a “significant whole,” as a 
domain of sense, he founded his methodology following an historical-archeological approach, 
which works by moving from significant to signify. Ricœur, however, interprets it differently, 
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recognising a specific role played by the corporal, natural, and causal dimension of the human 
being at the level of his cerebral and mental life, and in relation to the constitution of specific 
psychopathology, and in relation to psychoanalysis as psycho-therapy. However, it is certainly 
by following Hyppolite that he may clearly identify a strong, apparently unsolvable, antinomy 
between causal nexus and nexus of significance, and by correlation between causalistic-scientific 
language and interpretative-hermeneutic language. What is original in Ricœur is the fact that he 
tries to harmonise the two registers by correcting Freud’s scientistic auto-misunderstanding 
(Habermas) and Hyppolite’s excess in radicalising the hermeneutical approach. In some way, 
Hyppolite had a similar unilateral approach similar to Lacan; and what Ricœur tries to do with 
him is similar to what he tries to do with Lacan. In Ricœur’s De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud, 
Hyppolite’s lesson certainly helps him to manage the epistemological debate (Ricœur focused on 
this in 1958 at the historical Washington symposium), and he connect it to the phenomenological 
point of view (which indirectly ties Ricœur to the French tradition which re-reads psychoanalysis 
phenomenologically: Sartre, De Waelhens, Merleau-Pony, Henry et al.). Reversibly, Lacan’s 
theory helps him to articulate the theory of language and the linguistic point of view in dialectic 
with hermeneutics and to redefine the position and functioning of energetics in relation to it. But 
there is another element, a third element of commonality, which binds Hyppolite, Lacan, and 
Ricœur: their interest in variously relating Hegel’s phenomenology to Freud’s psychoanalysis. 
Actually, Ricœur largely employs Hegel’s dialectical-progressive approach, but Hyppolite and 
Lacan were the first to apply Hegelianism to the speculative revisiting of Freud, using Alexandre 
Kojève’s 1933 seminars on The Phenomenology of Spirit. Hyppolite was interested in demonstrating 
that it was possible to implement Freud’s work within a contemporary phenomenology of spirit 
by constructing/recognising a new figure of spirit, that of conscience dénégatrice.38 On the contrary, 
Lacan moved in the opposite direction, trying to present psychoanalysis as the overriding 
philosophy. Ricœur, however, borrowed from both in reconsidering Hegel’s phenomenology; 
and above all to Lacan, because he too used Kojève’s philosophy of desire to re-interpret the 
therapeutic relationship between analyst and patient in parallel with Hegel’s master-slave 
dialectic of recognition; a dialectic of recognition that Kojève reinterprets as the dialectic of desire 
for the desire of the other, because “all human, anthropogenetic Desire – the Desire that generates 
Self-Consciousness, the human reality – is, finally, a function of the desire for ‘recognition’.”39 The 
idea of pre-eminence as accorded to desire, structurally considered as the desire for recognition 
or désir du désir de l’autre, was accepted by Lacan, who followed Kojève’s seminars, interpreting as 
he did human history as the story of “desired desires,” and placed at the centre of his 
theorisation. As François Dosse explains, this theory of desire would constitute the centre of 
Lacan’s theorisation.40 Ricœur subsumed this dialectic re-addressing of Freud’s theory of 
psychoanalysis. It is in Image and Language in Psychoanalysis, particularly, that he explicitly makes 
reference to this theory of desire. He reads:  
The analytic situation offers desire what Freud, in one of his technical texts, calls “a 
playground in which [the patient’s compulsion to repeat] is allowed to expand in almost 
complete freedom.” Now why does the analytic situation have this virtue of reorienting 
repetition toward remembrance? Because it offers desire an imaginary face-to-face relation 
in the process of transference. Not only does desire speak, it speak to someone else, to the 
other person. This second starting point in analytic practice, too, does not lack theoretical 
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implications. It reveals that from its beginning human desire is, to use Hegel’s expression, 
the desire of another’s desire and finally for recognition.41  
The reference to Kojève’s interpretation is clear, as is the centrality accorded to Hegel, or 
even to the Freud-Hegel dialectic. Ricœur’s reference to Hegel represents a third way compared 
to that of Hyppolite (psychoanalysis re-absorbed by philosophy) and of Lacan (philosophy 
reabsorbed by psychoanalysis); in fact, he would consider the relationship between these two 
disciplines as mutual and dialectical, finally reconfiguring it theoretically, as a dialectic of 
opposing forces, dynamics, and hermeneutics. However, in his last dialogue on psychoanalysis 
with the Italian psychiatrist Giuseppe Martini, in 2003, Ricœur declared he would be inclined to 
evaluate his opposition between archaeology and teleology as the weaker part of his book on 
Freud. The reasons for this are different and must be considered closely, even if they are not 
realised in an essay or academic conference but in the context of a dialogue-interview. Beyond 
any doubt, it proves that the theoretical strength and productiveness of Hegelo-Freudianism was 
largely due to the cultural tendencies of the time; exactly as was the case with Lévi-Strauss and 
Lacan’s structuralism.  
From the Question of Proof as an Answer to Grünbaum’s Epistemic Critiques to 
a New Epistemological Paradigm in a Linguistic-Aesthetic Key 
Between the nineteen seventies and eighties, Ricœur developed a model of critical 
hermeneutics, methodologically and epistemologically structured, for the most part by following 
the theory of the arc herméneutique, which was structured around the theory of text and action, the 
epistemology of historical knowledge, and a reinterpretation of Freud’s psychoanalysis. A 
particular character of Freud’s psychoanalysis was the critical and difficult position of a double 
epistemic and procedural register, which in the seventies and eighties was progressively 
transformed into one of the first theoretical and disciplinary bases for this hermeneutical theory. 
In fact, there is a direct parallel between the “dialectic” of energetics and hermeneutics on the one 
side, and on the other this new methodological model for the human and social sciences, which 
coordinates explanation and understanding under the rule of interpretation. However, if this is the 
metamorphosis in Ricœur’s approach to psychoanalysis and his philosophical use, a second, 
progressive, metamorphosis occurs in his re-meditation on the epistemological problem of 
psychoanalysis itself. It is true that The Question of Proof in Freud’s Psychoanalytic Writings (1977) is 
substantially elaborated by following and reproducing the interpretative line of the 1965 essay. 
However, with a certain degree of evidence it seems that, in the end, it has an inclination to 
hermeneutics.42 This inclination is evident in Image and Language in Psychoanalysis and in the 
subsequent passage on the philosophy of psychoanalysis, which focuses more on clinical 
experience than theory. Ricœur re-used The Question of Proof in Freud’s Psychoanalytic Writings on 
another occasion – in the 1982 symposium of Louvain in memory of Alphonse de Waelhens – 
without making many modifications. After Grünbaum’s attack of his The Foundations of 
Psychoanalysis, the argument developed in this article became the answer to Grünbaum’s 
criticism. This is demonstrated by another article – La psychanalyse confrontée à l’épistémologie, 
published in 1986 – where he, after quoting Grünbaum’s book, began to re-present his 
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interpretation of the epistemic problem of Freud’s psychoanalysis from the perspective of the 
question of fact and proof in psychoanalysis.43 He writes:  
Le récent livre d’Adolf Grünbaum, Foundations of Psychoanalysis, confirme le malentendu 
qui règne entre psychanalystes et épistémologistes formés à l’école du Cercle de Vienne, 
prolongée par le positivisme logique. Ce relatif insuccès de la psychanalyse à se faire 
reconnaître pour science résulte de la négligence de tous, dans les deux camps également, 
à poser certaines questions préliminaires. // La première question concerne ce qui vaut 
comme fait en psychanalyse. La seconde concerne le type de relation qui existe entre la 
théorie et l’expérience analytique, sous son double aspect de méthode d’investigation et 
de traitement thérapeutique, enfin de la sorte de validation qu’on est en droit d’attendre 
dans le domaine de la psychanalyse: d’où la question de la preuve en psychanalyse.44  
A stronger perspective of epistemological and theoretical change has Image and Language 
in Psychoanalysis, because its theme presents Ricœur with the opportunity to re-actualise and 
reconsider some of the linguistic and theoretical aspects examined in his 1965 essay, going back 
to Lacan.  
The explicit goal of this article is to evaluate some reformulations of psychoanalysis “in 
terms of linguistic models borrowed either from structural linguistics, form Saussure to Jacobson, 
or from the transformational and generative linguistics coming from Chomsky.”45 
Ricœur refers again to Lacan’s article Fonction et champ de la parole in the first part of this 
work, where he presents “the reasons favouring such a linguistic reinterpretation, principally by 
dwelling upon analytic practice and more generally speaking on the analytic experience.”46 It is 
true that in the second part of the article he discusses the reasons for considering this 
reformulation as “a partial failure.” To him, in fact, “the universe of discourse appropriate to the 
analytic experience is not that of language, but that of the image.”47 However, at least two things 
suggest that Ricœur moves towards more closely following a linguistic and structuralist 
perspective. The first is the fact that he focuses on psychoanalysis from the perspective of the 
analytic experience, which is more strongly related to the communicative and narrative 
dimension of psychoanalysis; this was Ricœur’s tendency in the nineteen eighties and nineties 
when he develops his theory of the narrative identity. The secondly is that this new semiotic 
alternative counterpoised to the linguistic one is less strong in terms of contrast, compared to the 
contrast between hermeneutics and energetics. Definitely, in terms of philosophical uses, 
semiotics falls within the hermeneutical sphere.  
This theoretical-critical evolution is interesting in itself, as it could be deepened that 
perhaps Lacan’s influence played much more significant role in Ricœur’s interpretation of Freud 
and in his philosophical use of psychoanalysis than had a contingent effect of some temporal-
factual and provisional causes. Even reasoning from a larger general perspective on hermeneutics 
and epistemology, it seems that the article Image and Language in Psychoanalysis is significantly 
harmonisable with Ricœur’s hermeneutisation of psychoanalysis from the nineteen eighties, in 
which energetics as well as linguistics are subsumed within the hermeneutical reality. This larger 
perspective needs to consider Ricœur’s article Qu’est-ce qu’un texte? (1970) as a main reference, as 
the centre of this (quasi) radical hermeneutics turn. Actually, the function of interpretation must 
be predominant and pivotal in a new epistemological theory (the arc herméneutique theory) where 
 Lacan’s Epistemic Role in Ricœur’s Re-Reading of Freud 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 7, No 1 (2016)    ISSN 2155-1162 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2016.352    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu  
68 
 
explanation and understanding are ruled by interpretation, as Ricœur affirms and explains. It is clear 
that in order to realise this project, the concepts of both explanation and understanding must 
firstly be reorganised under a linguistic-hermeneutic domain. This is precisely what takes place 
in Ricœur’s reflection on what is a text.  
Analogous to the theory of action, Ricœur’s theory of text is developed under the general 
coordinates of hermeneutics; but, differently from the theory of action, it is destined to constitute 
the hub of his hermeneutical approach, generally speaking, as a methodological approach with 
multiple applications, as a new epistemological perspective, as a new theory of hermeneutics. 
This remains as a theoretical basis even passing from text to action. The theory of text is the core of 
Ricœur’s Du texte à l’action. Essais d’herméneutique II (1986). In this book Ricœur explains that, 
today, the concept of explanation is a non concept lent from the natural sciences and applied to 
scriptures, but it is generated from the sphere of language, transferring the minimal units of 
language (phonemes and lexemes) to the bigger and superior units of a phrase, like a story, 
folklore, or myth. Under this point of view, interpretation can better be compared to a model of 
intelligibility, in the sphere of linguistics, rather than other models extraneous for the human 
sciences.48 Ricœur overcomes in this way the antinomy of explanation and understanding. At an 
epistemological level, there is no separation or gap between explanation and understanding. 
Rigorously speaking, only explanation is methodical, whereas understanding is a non-methodical 
moment which in the human sciences runs parallel to explanation. Understanding precedes, 
follows, and closes explanation, wrapping it; on the contrary, explanation unwraps 
understanding analytically. It is clear that a similar conception is sustainable by a specific 
operation of centralisation of the role of language and hermeneutics in epistemology.  
In Ricœur’s arc herméneutique theory, explanation and understanding are harmonised 
with the work of interpretation because of a certain conception of the role of language; and if it is 
true, then forcibly there is a direct debt to linguistic theory and, indirectly, to Lacan’s re-
determination of Freud’s psychoanalysis. Why? Because if, on the one hand, it is true that the role 
of language and linguistic theory was reconsidered and limited by Ricœur in his 1965 essay, then 
on the other it is true that Ricœur, re-modulating his interpretation of Freud for a new general 
epistemology and methodology for the human sciences accentuated its hermeneutical and 
linguistic flexion. And this cannot be without consequences for his interpretation of Freud and 
Lacan’s psychoanalysis. In fact, in a parallel movement, Image and Language in Psychoanalysis 
proves to be a sort of process of renewal, re-actualisation, and re-thinking of Lacan’s lesson. It is a 
double process, because it is in connection to a new problematisation of the epistemology of 
psychoanalysis and (indirectly) to a new epistemological theory, where a certain structural 
conception of language (in human understanding) constitutes its basis.  
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